Iranian government-linked apps (Rubika, Soroush, Eitaa, Bale, iGap, BisPhone) are documented surveillance tools operated by entities with direct ties to the IRGC and intelligence services. They lack independent security audits, store all data on domestic servers accessible to state agencies, and have been used to identify, track, and prosecute dissidents. Using these apps exposes your identity, contacts, location, and communications to the Islamic Republic's surveillance apparatus.
Do NOT use these apps for any communication you wish to keep private. Use Signal (with a non-Iranian phone number) or Briar for sensitive communication. Use Tor Browser for anonymous browsing. Never mix personal and protest identities across apps.
Chart times are shown in your local timezone.
Infrastructure Health Index
0 of 0 services measured
% of monitored endpoints reporting normal at the infrastructure level. This does NOT reflect actual user experience :: censorship operates at layers these probes cannot detect.
Incident Velocity :: 24h
Number of service state transitions per hour. Red bars indicate above-average disruption activity.
Source:Javid Network Watch collector
Iran BGP Route Announcements :: 24h
Shows what % of Iran’s IP routes are announced in global BGP tables. Important: 100% does NOT mean the internet works. Iran maintains route announcements while blocking traffic via DPI, protocol filtering, and throttling. This metric only detects total route-withdrawal shutdowns (e.g. Nov 2019), not ongoing censorship.
Source:IODA / Georgia Tech
Tor Circumvention Demand
Estimated Tor bridge users from Iran. Spikes indicate increased demand for censorship circumvention tools.
Source:Tor Metrics
OONI Anomaly Rates
% of OONI probe tests showing interference. Higher = more censorship activity detected.
Source:OONI
Slowest HTTP Responses :: top 0
The 0 slowest currently reachable Iranian HTTP endpoints. Unreachable endpoints are listed separately, never plotted as fast bars.
Source:Javid Network Watch probes
ISP Route Visibility Gap
Each bar is the ISP's BGP visibility gap below its own 7-day peak (IODA signal). Empty bar = at peak. Route presence does NOT mean traffic flows :: this only detects route-withdrawal events, not filtering or throttling.
Source:IODA / Georgia Tech
Service Status Overview
Traffic-light view of Iranian websites and network endpoints. Green = reachable. Red = unreachable. Amber = unstable.
Source:Javid Network Watch probes
RIPE Atlas Probes
Hardware probes inside Iran measuring network reachability. A drop in connected probes correlates with shutdowns.
Source:RIPE Atlas
Recent Incidents
Key Signals :: 90-day daily rollup
One cell per UTC day. Green = normal, amber = partial disruption (5%+ of samples), red = down most of the day, grey = measurement failed, hollow = no data collected.
Source:IODA, OONI, Tor Metrics :: Javid Network Watch daily rollup